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Introduction 
If the fool would persist in his folly he would become wise.—Blake, The 
Marriage of Heaven and Hell 
T H I S STUDY explores the changing relation between desire and 
value, as they affect the protagonists' identity, in English novels 
between 1850 and 1928.1 examine the imaginative predilections 
of two mid-Victorians, two late-Victorians, and two Modernists. 
Each chapter seeks to identify the novelist's characteristic stance 
toward desire by interrogating in detail a pair of his novels.1 The 
study moves from narratives of repression and disguise in Dick-
ens and Eliot to narratives of release and celebration in Lawrence 
and Joyce. 
Seen synoptically, my book inquires into the novelistic 
imagination of freedom. It does so by examining a range of pro-
tagonists' capacities to accommodate and turn to creative per-
sonal use the givens of nature and culture. To be in a body is to 
experience desire and to be inscribed in the natural world of 
space and time. To have a mind is to inherit attitudes toward 
desire because one is inscribed in the cultural world of sanctions 
and prohibitions. Since no one creates either his body or his 
mind, all embodied thinking subjects—all protagonists—achieve 
their freedom in the measure that they come to terms with these 
matrical systems of nature and culture.2 
1 My discussion of Joyce centers on the major novel, Ulysses. 
2 1 realize that there are other and more spectacular forms of freedom, 
especially those that involve a risk of one's being in behalf of a chosen ideal. This 
is the domain of heroism proper. I have chosen to focus on a more obscure 
(though omnipresent) realm of freedom, that involved in a subject's relation to 
his inalienable given conditions. 
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Allegiance to nature and culture is involuntary. The charac-
ter of the allegiance alters, however, and that alteration is the 
subject of my book. At its most schematic, the argument goes 
like this: the mid-Victorians privilege culture; they imagine the 
protagonist becoming himself—achieving freedom—by subordi-
nating the givens of his natural body. The Modernists, by con-
trast, privilege nature; they envisage the protagonist's freedom 
and self-enactment in his capacity to affirm desire and to resist, 
ignore, or simply endure his culture's injunctions. Freedom is 
possible in both of these positions. For the novelists who come 
between mid-Victorian and Modern, however—for Hardy and 
Conrad—neither culture nor nature is privileged. Both systems 
are in limbo. The cultural scripts within the protagonist have lost 
their force but may not be discarded, while his natural propensi-
ties wreak havoc with his goals but may not be sanctioned. Hardy 
and Contrad cannot imagine self-discovery in terms other than 
self-rupture. Split between nature and culture, their protagonists 
rarely achieve identity or freedom. 
This development has considerable formal consequences. We 
begin with the mid-Victorian plot of a cohesive protagonist 
moving through public space and time and, eventually, either 
achieving the social career that he has personally willed or failing 
(for carefully documented reasons) to do so. This is the plot of 
Dickens and Eliot in which an unruly self grows up. His freedom 
is enacted as his capacity to realize—through his will—the pre-
scriptions of his culture: as Freud would say, to live up to the 
requirements of his superego. The late-Victorian plot of Hardy 
and Conrad characteristically accepts these societal terms but can-
not make good on them. Tess and Jude, Jim and Nostromo, 
want to love, work, and succeed exactly as their culture pre-
scribes, but the prescription is becoming chimera-like, beckoning 
yet unrealizable. Something at the core of the protagonist insists 
on or cannot evade the sabotage of aspirations. 
The novels of Lawrence and Joyce exploit this element of 
sabotage. Their early Bildungsromane elaborate the acculturation 
plot in all of its impossibility. Neither writer can imagine the 
subjective experience of freedom in its terms. Lawrence and Joyce 
both conceive a protagonistic self in opposition to this model, a 
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self that is not performed through the exercise of will, and not 
interested in a career defined by lengthy apprenticeship to and 
eventual mastery over culturally approved forms of work. Their 
great novels formally abandon or parody the plot of social inte-
gration. Lawrence imagines identity and freedom elsewhere; Joyce 
(in Ulysses) reconceives them here, within culture, but in terms 
that would perplex or scandalize his Victorian predecessors. 
I shall argue in Part One that in the fiction of Dickens and 
Eliot the subject is conceived as transcendentally pure, estab-
lished prior to cultural or natural constraints. Unlike the rebel-
lious Romantic version of this subject, the transcendental Vic-
torian subject chooses acculturation; he joins up. This orderly 
conception is of course disseminated by Victorian society; it is 
one of its foremost conventions. Thoughts and behavior that 
continue to transgress this normative convention may not be 
sanctioned in the protagonist; his career unfolds in the form of 
his gradual, often painful, assimilation of this norm. 
Such a career may exact a considerable price, for it insists 
on a subject fully capable of altruism, discipline, and earnestness: 
a subject who subordinates his own concerns to those of others, 
who controls his body's impulses, and whose consciousness is 
capable of self-knowledge. My study begins at those moments 
when this subject starts to become unimaginable. That is, those 
occasions on which Dickens and Eliot are unable to imagine the 
protagonist fulfilling his prescription because other elements, just 
glimpsed in the self but somehow exigent, seem to require an-
other denouement. In Dickens and Eliot these are only occasions 
because their imaginations are usually on good terms with their 
culture's protagonistic norm. Indeed, they never knowingly vio-
late this norm. The panorama of characters unlike the protago-
nist usually permits the lateral siphoning off of illicit energies. At 
times, however, something does go wrong. The writer's imagi-
nation, uncoercible, shows signs of apostasy. It apprehends as 
subjectively desirable a course of actions or cluster of feelings 
that the dictates of conscience must abjure. 
In Hardy and Conrad the cultural allegiances that make up 
conscience remain in place, but the writer's immediate apprehen-
sion of his subject's thoughts, desires, and probable behavior has 
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become further thwarted. He cannot imagine the free develop-
ment of a protagonist in terms that intersect his culture's norms, 
and he cannot endorse a development that violates those norms. 
I think of these novels as "tragic encounters" because the incar-
nate subject is embarked, increasingly, on a career conceived in 
terms that ensure disaster. His culturally enjoined identity—the 
sanctions by which he recognizes, orients, and evaluates him-
self—is losing its purchase on the immediate data of thought and 
feeling. He finds himself experiencing what he is incapable of 
accommodating; his culture has led him to propose for himself 
projects which he has no means of achieving. The scripts of leg-
ibility through which the culture licenses its models of identity 
are becoming for him inapplicable, but he will cancel himself 
through suicide rather than repudiate those scripts. His creator 
can imagine no exit from this dilemma. 
Lawrence and Joyce begin to demythologize these scripts. 
Both writers overtly recognize (rather than merely imply) the 
injurious effects of culturally licensed norms of identity, aspira-
tion, and career. The subject can be imagined as free again, be-
cause the relation between the subject and the myriad elements 
that compose and constrain it has been reconceived. The self no 
longer yearns to be transcendentally prior to the natural world 
(its incarnate grounding, the locus of its desires and actual pos-
sibilities), nor does it seek a perfect fusion with the cultural world 
(its ideological grounding, its human inheritance). The narratives 
that contain these newly conceived subjects are likewise rede-
signed to accommodate their newfound freedom. No plots of 
societal career that presuppose shared societal norms, likewise no 
plots of achieved escape that pre-suppose a transcendental self 
free of societal traces: in fact, little plot at all, for the freedom of 
these embodied subjects is largely constituted by their moment-
by-moment movement in time, essaying (sometimes whimsically, 
sometimes ecstatically) their conditional possibilities. 
SUCH, in summary form, is the argument of this book. I need 
now (at the risk of re-inventing the wheel) to identify the literary 
and philosophical premises that have made the argument possi-
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ble. These premises, everywhere operative though often un-
stated, cluster about the following terms: freedom, protagonist, 
plot, subject, self and society, transcendental and contingent, 
identity, and (above all) imagination. 
The question of freedom provides the rationale for this study's 
focus upon the career of the central figure(s), the protagonist(s), 
as well as for its considerable attention to the shape of plots. The 
protagonist is the character through whom the creative writer 
tends to imagine most intimately the experience of freedom. It 
is true, of course, that novelists project their sense of inner pos-
sibility into the whole of their created canvas—its range of char-
acters, its cluster of plots, its typical movement, its setting, its 
syntax. But preeminendy they convey their own subjective reality 
(what it feels like to be alive, responsive, and desiring in a world 
of others) through the creation of protagonists. 
Protagonists enact, however, a dual allegiance. If they house 
their creator's psychic investment, they also testify to the nor-
mative stresses of the society within which their creator moves. 
This crossing of subjective energy and societal constraint defines, 
for my study, their peculiar interest. Becky Sharpe, for example, 
accommodates her creator's shrewdest sense of reality, but 
Thackeray has not treated her as a protagonist: he has not sought 
to align her energies within the web of her society's norms. In-
deed, she may be defined as the power of illicit energies on the 
other side of the norms. In the Victorian novel the protagonists 
must move, in good faith, in the daylight of their culture's sanc-
tions, however shaped they may be, simultaneously, by the noc-
turnal energies of their creator's imagination. (This tension be-
tween sanctioned forms of expression and wayward energies 
seeking release is the recurrent focus of Parts One and Two of 
this study. In Part Three the tension alters, as the Modernists 
call into question the sanctioning process itself.) 
The range of movements that these protagonists desire to 
make exists in a dialectic relation to the movements that they are 
actually empowered to make. The shape of this dialectic is the 
plot. To discuss the plot is to register the variety of non-subjec-
tive elements that affect the career of the protagonists: their ca-
pacity for freedom. 
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Paradoxically, this opposition—protagonist versus society— 
is at the same time an equation: protagonist-and-society. The self 
that desires and the society that restrains are interpenetrative terms. 
The romantic opposition of self (unscripted, pure) versus society 
(scripted, maculate, corrupting) is, on scrutiny, untenable—un-
tenable because it assumes that self is transcendentally prior to 
society. If we reject this metaphysical assumption, we must con-
clude that "self' and "society" answer to opposed optics on a 
common spectrum of phenomena, for how could self be consti-
tuted if not from the materials—family, school, church, law, cus-
toms, etc.—of society? And how could society be conceived apart 
from its status as a historically descended commonwealth of selves? 
The materials are common but the optics are opposed. This 
simple point has considerable implications. Self can neither van-
quish society nor be merged into it: their difference is as inextin-
guishable as it is incomplete. An entity located in society, in every 
respect composed of elements common to society, self is never-
theless not society. Or, to put it more precisely, self refers to no 
entity at all—for entity implies object—but rather to the char-
acteristic mode of relations that an individual as subject sustains 
with himself and with the social world in which he lives. 
For the writer as writer, that mode of subjective relation is 
imaginative: we arrive thus at one of the governing concepts of 
this study, imagination. Imagination is the writer's preeminent 
faculty, a power of perception that has no transcendental status, 
is at all times conditioned, but is nevertheless unpredictable. It 
carries the writer's identity for, unlike his conscience, it is not 
the property of his culture's norms. Not that it is exclusively his 
own property either, to be shaped at will. "Perception is not 
whimsical but fatal," says Emerson, and imagination is that ine-
luctable manner of seeing things that marks the writer's ineluc-
table identity (156). Operative within consciousness but not coe-
qual with it, shaped through the pressure of conscience by cultural 
sanctions but equally a mode of responding to and deploying 
those sanctions, gradually and unconsciously formed over the years, 
a writer's imagination is his signature. It expresses (with what-
ever internal fissures) his inclusive way of reading his world.3 
3 For a shrewd discussion of how a writer's conflicted psychology creates 
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The point is important because it carries the issue of the 
writer's freedom (and by extension that of his characters). To be 
conditioned is not to be unfree; to be shaped by societal para-
digms is not to be deprived of self. Self is authenticated through 
the deployment of materials not self-originated. The presence of 
ineradicable societal traces within a writer's imagination only means 
that his freedom is constituted by his relation to those traces: by 
what he does with and through them. The evolving dialectic 
between a writer's imagination and his given conditions (both 
inner and outer)—a dialectic as unpredictable as it is unrepeata-
ble—finally if his creative freedom. Meditating on this dialectic, 
Proust states the case succincdy: 
Moreover this reaction of locally procured materials on 
the genius who utilises them and to whose work their re-
action imparts an added freshness, does not make the work 
any less individual, and whether it be that of an architect, a 
cabinet-maker or a composer, it reflects no less minutely the 
most subtle shades of the artist's personality, because he has 
been compelled to work in the millstone of Senlis or the red 
sandstone of Strasbourg, has respected the knots peculiar to 
the ash-tree, has borne in mind, when writing his score, the 
resources, the limitations, the volume of sound, the possi-
bilities of a flute or alto voice. (1:682) 
The authority of individual achievement (and thereby the 
creator's identity) depends not on the myth of a transcendental 
subject working within the vacuum of its self-chosen terms and 
instruments. Rather, Proust indicates, it emerges through the 
performance of a contingent subject operating under the pressure 
of innumerable restrictions, and actualizing himself through those 
restrictions. Such a performative model of identity accommo-
fissures within the writing itself, see the essays Frederick Crews has collected in 
Out of My System. Crews candidly discusses the appeal and the pitfalls of a psy-
choanalytic approach to literature. See also Julia Kristeva's Desire in Language: A 
Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. Kristeva locates the problematics of lan-
guage in both the artifice of the sign and instinctual drives that skew any straight-
forward communication of meaning. Mikhail Bakhtin very suggestively reads 
Dostoevsky's entire corpus as an interplay of conflicting subjective voices, none 
subordinated to a single commanding design. 
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dates both authors and their protagonists; it underlies in a num-
ber of ways the argument of this book. 
With respect to authors, the model suggests that their power 
is inseparable from their receptivity—to the bias of their imagi-
nation, to the exigencies of their medium, to the constraints of 
their culture. The writer's imagination, even as it eludes his would-
be-sovereign will, records the stresses of his situation. He may 
truck with his imagination, abuse it, exploit it, but he cannot 
commandeer its testimony. (The latent quarrel within this faculty 
between the press of nature and the restraint of culture [between 
the unconscious and the superego] animates my chapters on 
Dickens and Eliot. This same quarrel, become overt, animates 
my chapters on Hardy and Conrad. The attempt to heal the quarrel 
animates my chapter on Lawrence and Joyce.) 
Insofar as the Proustean model accommodates protagonists, 
it focuses attention less on their intrinsic properties than on their 
mode of relations with the world they inhabit. Freedom and 
identity emerge in the subject's transactions, in his capacity, not 
to create new conditions, but to realize himself by accepting and 
energizing his given conditions. Throughout, of course, these 
given conditions are nature and culture, bodily desire and socie-
tal constraint. They have been addressed first in terms of my 
book's argument, next in terms of its premises. They may now 
be approached in terms of its methodology. 
T H E SEMANTICS of desire: my title comes from Paul Ricoeur. 
In the opening pages of his study of Freud, Ricoeur speaks of 
"the semantics of desire, a semantics that centers around a some-
what nuclear theme: as a man of desires I go forth in disguise— 
larvatus prodeo" (6-7). A man of desires is opaque—to himself, 
to others. To be understood, he must be subjected to a herme-
neutical scrutiny that will unravel his utterance by locating the 
kernel of unacknowledged desire that is serving as its orientation. 
Ricoeur goes on to identify Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as the 
three master critics of a school of suspicion that specializes in the 
art of unmasking. In their work the testimony of subjective con-
sciousness becomes systematically suspect, for consciousness is 
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everywhere blind to its own strategic biases. Conditioned by an 
economic system that dictates his ideology, a libidinal system 
that controls his erotic choices, and a will to power that predis-
poses him to the exploitation of others, the mystified subject 
nevertheless manages to think of himself as transcendentally free, 
guileless, and self-knowing. "Beginning with [Marx, Nietzsche, 
and Freud]," Ricoeur writes, "understanding is hermeneutics: 
henceforward, to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the con-
sciousness of meaning, but to decipher its expressions" (33). 
In order to assess properly the subject's hidden condition-
ality, this study will supplement its literary analysis by drawing 
(especially in the chapter on Dickens) on Nietzsche and Freud. 
Both thinkers subvert a nineteenth-century model of the subject 
as innocent and autonomous. Nietzehe seeks to dislodge this model 
of the subject by exposing the concealed presence of an amoral 
will to power within its discourse and behavior, while Freud's 
hermeneutic charts the disowned movement of unresolved (and 
likewise amoral) sexual energies within the same discourse and 
behavior. For both thinkers, the subject is essentially unaware of 
his own motives. 
A critical methodology rigidly shaped to the contours of the 
Freud-Nietzsche model has, however, its limitations. Put simply, 
such a model is too suspicious; it assumes, programmatically, 
that consciousness is opaque to all of the subject's deeper inten-
tions. The point is important because Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud—in their common premise of a mystified subject—have 
served as a point de repere for recent interpretive theory. The shared 
premise is that an initiated observer with a privileged herme-
neutical lens can identify those ideological crossings that the au-
thor himself has absorbed but not understood, and which have 
actively produced his text.4 Terry Eagleton writes: 
4 The contemporary makers of this argument are legion. For an excellent 
overview, see Josue V. Harari's "Critical Factions/Critical Fictions." A handful 
of representative works that explore or expound this premise include Jonathan 
Culler's Structuralist Poetics, Paul de Man's Blindness and Insight, Terry Eagleton's 
Criticism and Ideology, Michel Foucault's Les mots et les choses and L'ordre du dis-
cours, Frank Lentricchia's After the New Criticism, and Edward Said's Beginnings. 
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Criticism is not a passage from text to reader: its task is not 
to redouble the text's self-understanding, to collude with its 
object in a conspiracy of eloquence. Its task is to show the 
text as it cannot know itself, to manifest those conditions of 
its making (inscribed in its very letter) about which it is 
necessarily silent. It is not just that the text knows some 
things and not others; it is rather that its very self-knowl-
edge is the construction of a self-oblivion. (43) 
To an extent I have followed this shrewd (and in its way 
irresistible) advice: the author begets but does not own his text. 
Ineradicably stained by ideology himself, how could he fail to 
produce a text that says more and other things than it knows 
itself saying? The critic's job is not to cooperate with the text but 
to expose it. Explain, don't interpret: so runs the current axiom. 
The stance is deliberately neutral if not hostile. The text must be 
approached from a standpoint as insistently external to the text's 
own self-understanding as possible. This argument is buttressed 
by the sophisticated awareness that no text can be fully entered 
on its own subjective terms anyway: and if the critic is irreme-
diably outside, let him make a virtue of his foreignness. 
At this point the price that a hermeneutics of suspicion pays 
for its insight comes into view. The subject is transformed into 
the object. Since it cannot be grasped in its self-understanding, 
since, moreover, it has no access to its own deepest implications, 
it must expressly undergo a tactics of alienation. It becomes, in 
the current critical act, an entity foreign to itself and foreign to 
its observer.5 Insofar as my deepest epistemological conviction is 
that we understand only those human objects whose inner sub-
jectivity we can imagine, I draw back from this model of the 
alienated object. It needs to be counter-balanced by a model of 
the coherent subject. 
This counter-model is phenomenological in two respects. It 
reads the work of art as expression, as a complex imaginative 
5 Roland Bardies' S/Z, in its dismantling and reconstruction of an incon-
spicuous tale by Balzac, is probably the terminus ad quern of this methodological 
model. Bardies' interest in the tale, and his capacity to find the tale interesting, 
are remarkable. What is generally missing, however, is Balzac. 
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gesture toward wholeness and self-discovery on the part of the 
author who created the work. And it proposes, as the task of 
criticism, the most intimate relation possible to the creative voice 
at the heart of the work.6 This intimacy, like all intimacy, de-
pends upon a critical surrender to the entity being approached. 
My book seeks, therefore, to approach the self-understanding of 
the novelistic universe in question, to identify its nodal and en-
abling assumptions, those creative premises that have generated 
its characteristic shape and concerns and that intimate what can 
and cannot be achieved within its contours. I do not claim to 
have entered the subjective voice of each novelist, and it may be 
that my attempt to approach that voice is, ultimately, indefensi-
ble (because, the Derridean argument runs, there is no voice to 
be approached). In any event, I remain persuaded that the writ-
er's imagination does shape such a voice, and that deliberately to 
ignore it amounts to a denaturing of the object under scrutiny. 
Edward Said discusses the issue of the writer's command 
over his own meanings in terms of authority and molestation. 
Authority refers to the related notions of begetting, continuing, 
controlling, and possessing that are bound up in the master idea 
of an empowering creative subject. Molestation refers to the ob-
6 Within the practice of literary criticism, phenomenology means, most 
generally, those methodologies that seek to locate in a writer's work (indeed in 
all his utterances) the hidden movement of his subjective consciousness in search 
of its own wholeness. This search necessarily traverses the entire world of objects 
within which the subject lives: for the riddle of subjective identity is inscribed 
precisely in his manifold relations with the objective world. Practitioners I have 
learned most from are Georges Poulet, Jean-Pierre Richard, and (in their earlier 
work) Leo Bersani, Geoffrey Hartman, and J. Hillis Miller. See Georges Poulet, 
Studies in Human Time, The Interior Distance, The Metamorphoses of the Circle; 
Jean-Pierre Richard, Litterature et sensation; Leo Bersani, Marcel Proust: The Fic-
tions qfLft and Art; Geoffrey H. Hartman, Wordsworth's Poetry: 1787-1814; J. Hillis 
Miller, Charles Dickens: The World of His Noveb; The Disappearance of God: Five 
Nineteenth-Century Writers; Poets of Reality: Six Twentieth-Century Writers; and 
Thomas Hardy: Distance and Desire. Sarah Lawall discusses many of these critics 
and their interpretive models in her Critics of Consciousness. As a philosophical 
movement, Phenomenology derives from the work of Edmund Husserl. Non-
specialists will find a more accessible presentation of the major premises in Maur-
ice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur (Le conflit des interpretations), and Vincent Des-
combes. 
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stacles to authority, "a consciousness of one's duplicity, one's 
confinement to a Active, scriptive realm, whether one is a char-
acter or a novelist" (84). The terms are necessarily dialectical, for 
all non-transcendental authority emerges within the impersonal 
and inhibiting conditions that make up molestation. 
I have approached my six novelists as simultaneously in-
stances of this dialectic and writers about it. Their sovereign con-
trol rewards a phenomenological movement of submission, even 
as their failures of authority—their susceptibility to molesta-
tion—solicit a critical model of suspicion. Each chapter regulates 
in its own fashion the ratio of trust to suspicion. Indeed, as each 
fictional world is composed in its own distinctive terms, so the 
approach varies to accommodate the specific tenor of those terms. 
For example, the Dickens world invites sustained attention to a 
wide range of relationships, all keyed to an ambiguous emotional 
dynamic. By contrast, the Eliot, Hardy, and Conrad novels focus 
more narrowly on protagonistic quests. Analysis of these latter 
writers is therefore briefer and more strictly attentive to the rea-
sons why such quests are ill-conceived or foredoomed. When I 
reach Lawrence, I encounter a radically different kind of career 
from any earlier examined; my chapter attends in detail to the 
contours of that career in both his life and art. Career itself—the 
idea of disciplined progress toward an established goal—becomes 
a comic notion in Ulysses; thus that huge novel is approached not 
as a field of developing life-histories, but rather as a resonant 
universe, bristling at any given moment with its constituent pat-
terns and discontinuities, but going nowhere. 
The approach may vary, but, to use Lawrence's phrase, I 
keep my eye on carbon. The focus in every chapter remains on 
the identity-bearing encounter between desiring subject and re-
straining context. These discrete assessments are throughout re-
lated to the larger dimensions of the writer's enterprise, with 
increasing emphasis upon relevant connections among the six 
novelists. Yet this study's first allegiance is to the movement of 
embodied protagonists through a single writer's landscape of in-
hibiting conditions. Each novelist imagines this movement in his 
own way. I prefer to run the risk of an apparently uncentered 
discourse rather than force each fictional world to fit the frame 
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of a univocal vocabulary (mine) and to serve as objective in­
stances that bear out an unvarying argument (also mine). 
Nietzsche and Freud remain eminences grises in this book. 
(Radical trust in the text's self-knowledge is as limiting a premise 
as radical distrust.) The contexts of molestation they clarify are, 
on the one hand, the imperious pressures of the body on thought 
and behavior, and, on the other, the increasingly disabling char­
acter of cultural scripts of identity and aspiration. As this study 
reaches its third phase (the Modernists), many of these molesta­
tions have themselves become auctorially assimilated. Lawrence 
and Joyce endow their protagonists with an awareness of the 
body's nature and the culture's artifice that had to enter my ear­
lier writers' work either surreptitiously or with tragic conse­
quences. 
A more sustained focus on molestation would call even more 
deeply into question the authority of the subject. (Desire itself 
has its societal models,7 and there remain to be assessed those 
cultural and economic factors discussed by the Marxists.) I con­
tinue, however, to believe in a coherent subject (though neither 
transcendentally posited nor perfectly self-knowing), and I con­
tinue to believe it possible to approach the imaginative voice at 
the center of that subject's discourse. Structuralists would remind 
me that such approach can be conducted only through language 
and is therefore a chimera: language being an empty system con­
stituted by differences and therefore hostile to qualitative notions 
of voice and identity. My provisional defense against this form 
of molestation (and against others that would wholly unseat the 
idea of authority) is to repeat a statement made earlier in this 
introduction: to be conditioned is not to be unfree; to be shaped 
by societal paradigms is not to be deprived of self. To the body 
7 For the cultural inflection of desire, see Β,εηέ Girard, Deceit, Desire, and 
the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Girard would reject my governing 
assumptions since he sees desire as an entirely culture-determined phenomenon: 
imitative, deceitful, and worthless. He assesses European novelists according to 
the rigor with which, in his view, they expose and excoriate desire. I find his 
book provocative, though it proceeds from assumptions and arrives at conclu­
sions considerably opposed to my own. 
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and mind that we have not created ourselves must be added the 
language whose systemic organization is also not of our own 
making. Yet our freedom, like our authority, consists exacdy in 
what we achieve with and through our conditional body, mind, 
and language. 
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